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In this volume Vittorio Bufacchi argues for the centrality of the concept of social injustice in political philosophy. The first two essays go right to the core of the matter. Traditionally, social justice is thought of as prior to injustice, and not only etymologically. It is by knowing what is just that we can observe deviations from justice and point to the injustices that permeate our societies. Bufacchi disagrees: not all policies that fail to meet our ideals of justice are unjust, and looking at our societies from the point of view of who suffers injustice can give us insights that we may miss out if we start from specific principles of justice.
The first essay in this volume is intended to persuade the reader that social injustice is primary, while social justice is derivative. There are many situations and policies that strike us as unjust and make us look for alternatives. Yet in the absence of a clear definition, we may end up by equating injustice with everything that is evil in the world. Although intuitively, emotionally and motivationally we can appreciate that injustice is prior to justice, from the conceptual point of view is there a way to make sense of what injustice is without a notion of justice? 
Bufacchi proposes that the concept of injustice is captured by the notions of maldistribution, exclusion and disempowerment. If we look at injustice from the perspective of what is distributed, maldistribution occurs when benefits and burdens of cooperation are distributed according to criteria that could not reasonably be accepted from everyone’s point of view. Any instance of social injustice is a case of maldistribution. A second dimension of injustice concerns the recipients of distributions. Exclusion, or denial of recognition, points at those actions and policies that exclude some individuals or groups as legitimate recipients of distribution. Finally, the third dimension, disempowerment, points at injustice from the point of view of who suffers injustice, typically characterised by a sense of humiliation and powerlessness. Thus not all evils are injustices, but injustice can be located by looking at who are the subject of distribution, the criteria for distribution, and the distribution of power.
 Without doubt these three dimensions are useful in locating injustice and distinguishing it from mere inequality or unspecified evils. However, it is difficult to see how these can be identified without reference to an idea of equitable distribution, of appropriate exclusion, of balanced distribution of power. Indeed, Bufacchi’s definition of maldistribution is the reversal of Rawls’s definition of acceptable distribution, i.e. one that should be acceptable from the point of view of everyone. How can we claim that some are unjustly excluded from distribution if we do not have an idea of what entitles an agent as recipient of distribution? For example, should we consider all members of a political society? Or should cooperation be understood as crossing political borders? And how do we know when unequal distribution of power is wrong? 
The definitions provided in this volume, rather than proving that justice is derivative, suggest that justice and injustice are two faces of the same coin, and we cannot point at injustice without having an idea of what would make a just and appropriately inclusive distribution. However, as I will explain, the focus on injustice and its priority acquires significance in the framework of Bufacchi’s methodological implications for the ways we do political philosophy.
Bufacchi’s principal merit is to point out that the motivation to rectifying injustice should inform the work of political philosophers, against recent tendencies to technicalisation and specialisation of political philosophy, often addressing primarily other specialists. Drawing on the lesson of Brian Barry, to whom the volume is dedicated, Bufacchi holds that the scope of political philosophy goes beyond that of an academic discipline. Political philosophy has the goals to identify the nature of social and political problems that we face; set the agenda for future action; and point to solutions for the identified problems. Bearing in mind these goals is necessary if we want to avoid it losing relevance for our practical life.
It is exactly this ‘hands on view’ of political philosophy that better explains in what sense injustice is for Bufacchi prior to justice. Political philosophy should be primarily problem-driven. It is by observing reality that we come to a critical view of our political and social institutions and are motivated to find alternative solutions. 
What is more, empirical experience of injustice and data on the real world play also a crucial role in the work of applied philosophy. The relationship between philosophical models and applied philosophy is not the same as that, say, between mathematics and applied mathematics. Mathematical models may be useful to solve some practical problems. Yet if a model is not useful in a particular applied case, this does not lead to revise the model. One may choose a different model, but one would not revise the mathematical model itself because it does not fit the practice.
Bufacchi’s view of practical philosophy is that our theories must be revised if we see that they do not work when applying them. We may start with a theory, a principle or a judgement and apply it to a real world situation, but ‘using’ these principles for practical purposes brings us to challenge them, and possibly to change and modify them. This is similar to natural sciences, where theories may be modified in light of new data. The methodology proposed by Bufacchi is similar to Rawls’s model of reflective equilibrium. When asking ourselves whether our institutions or policies are just or unjust, we start from our intuitions, but we should be prepared to revise them when we realise that they do not match the practice, going back and forth between empirical evidence and principle until equilibrium is reached. What Bufacchi, following Glover, calls ‘empirical philosophy’ follows a ‘bottom up’ approach in which empirical research, including case studies, is followed, rather than preceded, by general theorising. The mutual adjustment between intuitive responses to practical problems and theory gives rise to a reflective equilibrium. Thus empirical findings are not simply used to corroborate the theory, but are integral part of the problem framing and contribute to the definition of the theory.
A good example of the advantages of this methodology - compared to the top down approach, which applies a general theory to empirical cases - is presented in the fifth chapter of the volume (Torture, Terrorism, and the State: A Refutation of the Ticking-Bomb Argument, written with Jean Maria Arrigo).
The ‘ticking-bomb argument’ is a well-known consequentialist argument for defending the legitimacy of interrogational torture in democratic states. According to this argument torture is permissible in exceptional cases, when there is a terrorist in custody who possesses critical knowledge, such as the location of a time bomb that will soon explode and cause great loss of innocent lives. This is a hypothetical argument, based on a thought experiment. The point of the essay is to substitute these thought experiments with real cases and evidence about torture. Once we consider empirical evidence about torture, its actual motivations, techniques, consequences, we cannot help to regard the ticking bomb argument as a void philosophical exercise, which has very little to do with applied philosophy, understood as a problem-oriented discipline. Evidence is presented for example that terrorists, even when holding crucial information, normally do not reveal the correct information under torture, and that even more rarely correct information is obtained in a time short enough to allow preventing greater harm. Thus the premises of the ticking bomb argument are contentious from the empirical point of view. What is more, there are consequentialist reasons to reject the argument according to which torturing the terrorist maximises welfare by saving several innocent lives. The underlying assumption is that the potential harm done to the terrorist has to be compared to the potential harm done by the explosion of the time bomb. Yet empirical evidence shows that the damages of torture are not limited to those inflicted on the tortured. The practice of torture, it is argued, presupposes the institutionalisation of interrogational torture, involving medical doctors, the military establishment and perhaps requiring professional torturers. Evidence points out that the long term damages inflicted by torture to the people involved in interrogation and to the supporting democratic institutions are great enough to compete with the expected benefits of torturing terrorists. Taking into account these potential damages associated with torture diminishes the appeal of the ticking bomb argument and warns us of its narrative oversimplicity.
This essay offers an excellent example of what philosophical reflection can gain by taking seriously the relevant empirical information. The advantages are not limited to framing problems correctly but also to developing theoretical approaches and refining conceptual definitions. Bufacchi holds that applied philosophy has much to gain from incorporating empirical research. The idea is not to transform the philosopher into a social scientist, but to point out that considering the work of social and natural scientists and try to do philosophical work informed by the best up to date empirical information is fundamental for addressing problems in a way that is relevant not only for academic debates, but for the societies we live in.
In this vein, the essays of this volume suggest that the priority of injustice rest in the fact that we may start from what we find unjust in our societies, do empirical research on it and by applying philosophical reflection will be better equipped to understand where injustice is, what it amounts to and what we are morally required to do to redress it.
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